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The controversy surrounding the creation and implementation of
two National Collegiate Athletic Association student-athlete eligi
bility rules, Proposition 48 and Proposition 42, was the focus of
this study. The two rules required that a student's scholastic grade
point average and SAT scores be factored into scholarship and ath
letic admissions decisions.

By describing the unfolding social pro

cess respecting the creation of these two eligibility rules, this
study addressed issues vital to rule creating processes in general.
The social constructionist perspective was utilized as a theo
retical guide for this study, allowing for the examination of claims
makers and their social claims regarding the state and needs of in
tercollegiate athletics.

Two dissimilar theoretical models, criti

cal theory and cartel theory, were used to interpret the creation
and reaction to the eligibility rules.
A critical analysis indicated that the NCAA was concerned with
maintaining its regulatory control over the association as well as
increasing the overall integrity of the association.

A cartel theory

analysis indicated that by placing recruiting restrictions on member
institutions, the NCAA was able to limit the competition between its
members, thereby increasing revenue for the entire membership.
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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE LITERATURE
The Problem
For over 125 years, collegiate athletics have engaged, employ
ed, and entertained its participants, coaches, and fans, respective
ly, thereby establishing itself as a permanent fixture in American
culture (Lawrence, 1987).

The administration and governance of most

intercollegiate athletics have been carried out by the National Col
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) since the early part of this
century.

In recent years, considerable debate has beset the NCAA

and educators alike concerning the creation of specific rules which
define eligibility for athletic participation in intercollegiate
sports.
This research will specifically focus on the creation, imple
mentation, and controversy surrounding two rules designed by the NCAA
to regulate athletic eligibility for freshmen: Propositions 48 and
42.

The relevance of this study, sociologically, is that it ad

dresses issues vital to understanding rule creating processes.

Such

issues include: the role of groups or associations involved in a
rule's creation, interests served by a rule's creation, and conse
quences of a rule's creation.

Hence, this study seeks to not only

describe and explain the creation process of two NCAA freshmen ath
letic eligibility rules, but additionally address questions concern-
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ing why, and in whose interests, the rules were created.
Further significance for this research lies in the following.
First, the research attempts to address organizational and opera
tional concerns in relation to sport and education, issues which en
compass questions of political structure and racial exploitation.
Second, few sociologists have attempted to clarify the social pro
cesses that depict the creation of rules in sport, specifically in
intercollegiate sport.

I-n essence, this project seeks to provide

sociologists with a critical understanding of the divergent percep
tions relating to the creation of Propositions 48 and 42, for these
views are an integral part of the continually unfolding social pro
cess which affects the creation of similar rules in intercollegiate
athletics.
Proposition 48, the first of the two eligibility rules to be
addressed, was adopted in 1983 by the NCAA and instituted in 1986.
This rule mandated that individuals seeking athletic participation
at any of the NCAA's Division I colleges and universities must
achieve:
1.

A combined minimum score of 700 on the Scholastic Aptitude

Test (SAT) or a score of 15 on the American College Test (ACT),
while
2.

Maintaining a 2.0 grade point average throughout high

school.
Failure to meet one, but not both of these requirements, re
sulted in a partial qualifier status, and athletic eligibility could
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not commence until the individual's second academic year of college,
though an athletic scholarship could be granted for the first aca
demic year.

Commencement of athletic participation in the second

academic year was, however, dependent on the successful completion
of 24 units of study over the first year.

Those athletes failing to

meet both the standardized test and GPA requirements would not be
offered any type of scholarship and would not be eligible for ath
letic participation.

In addition, under the original rule partial

qualifiers could choose not to accept an athletic scholarship and
finance their first year of school themselves.

This would preserve

the athletes fourth year of athletic eligibility.
The second of the rules to be examined in this research is
Proposition 42.

Adopted in 1989 and instituted the following year,

Proposition 42 eliminated the classification of partial qualifier.
In other words, the rule stipulated that financial aid would only be
provided to those students meeting both the grade point average and
standardized test prerequisites.
Both Proposition 48 and Proposition 42 drew tremendous criti
cism primarily from black leaders, coaches, and others because ath
letic eligibility and scholarship distribution were contingent on
the use of standardized tests which are known to be culturally bias
ed.

This issue, more or less, set the stage for seven years of up

heaval concerning the NCAA's goals and educational mission.
To begin this study, several preliminary issues must be ad
dressed.

First; the historical background of the NCAA must be exam-

4

ined.

To understand the rule creating process with respect to the

NCAA, we must understand how the present agents of social control in
intercollegiate athletics came into existence.

Secondly, after ex

amining the history of the NCAA, three issues encompassing the crea
tion, implementation, and contention of rules 48 and 42 will be ad
dressed.

These issues are the role and integrity of athletics in

higher education, racial discrimination and exploitation in sport,
and the effectiveness of--standardized tests as predictors of educa
tional achievement.
Next, a social constructionist theoretical framework will be
introduced as a guide for this study.

Such a framework allows the

social processes through which people construct the social world to
be described (Thomas, 1982).

After introducing the contextual con

structionist approach that will be utilized, Herbert Blumer's (1971)
five stage process of collective definition for a social problem
will be previewed for use in Chapters II and III.

This will be fol

lowed by a brief introduction of the two distinct theoretical mod
els, critical theory and cartel theory, which will be used in the
analysis chapter of this thesis.

Finally, this chapter closes with

a brief discussion of methodology and relevant issues.
The Evolution of the NCAA
Precursors
The first intercollegiate athletic contest, an eight-oared
barge race between Harvard and Yale, took place in 1852 (Hart-
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Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986).

Seventeen years later, on November 16,

1869, Rutgers and Princeton staged the first intercollegiate foot
ball game at Rutgers's field in New Brunswick, New Jersey (Lawrence,
1987).
With the increasing popularity of football in the 1870s, Prin
ceton, in 1876, invited representatives from three schools, Harvard,
Columbia, and Yale, to Springfield, Massachusetts, to organize an
association that would arlow the rules of football to be standard
ized (Lawrence, 1987).

The meeting produced the forerunner to the

NCAA, the Intercollegiate Football Association (IFA).

Representa

tives of the association, typically undergraduate students, met once
a year to change and update the rules of football.
The game of football continued to evolve during the 1880s, as
did strategies that increased injuries.

In spite of the injuries,

it was disputes over rule interpretation and player eligibility that
led to Harvard's departure from the IFA in 1889, and the disbandment
of the association altogether in 1893 (Farrell, 1989; Lawrence,
1987).
After the departure of the IFA, several rules committees ma
terialized, most notably the Western Intercollegiate Athletic Con
ference (WIAC), the forerunner of the Big Ten.

Here, conference

schools were encouraged to establish their own rules regarding eli
gibility, the number of years an athlete could participate in foot
ball, and contest rules.

However, a great deal of confusion soon

flourished due to the fact that teams often had to learn two or more
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sets of rules.

This confusion resulted in a game of football that

was exceedingly more violent than it had been in the past.

The 1905

season alone resulted in 18 deaths (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986;
Lawrence, 1987).
On December 8, 1905, 13 institutions sent representatives to
New York City to debate and vote on the abolishment of football.
After a majority vote decided to retain football, a second meeting
was scheduled for all institutions who participated in the sport.
Later that month, representatives from 62 schools met to adopt a
committee who would be charged with designing a standardized set of
rules for football.

The rules (Lawrence, 1987) were to:

1. open the game (making greater use of the entire playing
field);
2. eliminate rough and brutal play;
3. achieve efficient enforcement, making the rules definite
and precise in all respects such as definitions of brutal
play; and
4. organize a permanent body of officials. (p. 10)
This group of schools formally titled itself the Intercollegiate
Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS).

The IAAUS ap-

pointed a president, assigned a committee to draft a constitution,
and agreed to meet the following year.

Though the formation of the

IAAUS required institutions to relinquish a certain amount of conrol, an association had emerged that would standardize the rules of
football, as well as later assume the responsibility of regulation
(Lawrence, 1987).
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Early Structure
All colleges and universities in the United States were eligi
ble for membership in the IAAUS.

Members had to agree to adhere to

the IAAUS's standards of athletic conduct as well as agree to con
front abuses in college sports (Farrell, 1989).

A $25 membership

fee was instituted to defray the costs of officers, committees, and
administration, and accordingly granted each active member one vote
on all motions at the annual convention.
In 1910 the IAAUS became the National Collegiate Athletic As
sociation (NCAA).

Given the NCAA's desire for expansion, membership

categories changed intermittently.

Two categories existed in 1908,

three by 1922, and four by 1941 (Lawrence, 1987).

Presently, five

membership categories exist: active, provisional, conference, affiliated, and corresponding (NCAA Manual, 1995-96).
Active members are four or two year accredited institutions
elected to membership who have the right to compete for champion
ships, vote on legislation and enjoy other designated privileges.
A provisional membership is a temporary or trial membership (limited
to 3 years), granted to institutions who have applied for active
membership.

A member conference is a membership granted to a group

of colleges and/or universities who conduct competition amongst it
members and determines conference champions in one or more sports
(NCAA Manual, 1995-96).

Examples of member conferences include the

Big Ten, Southeastern, and Mid-American conferences.
Affiliated memberships were established for associations and
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groups relating to collegiate athletics but failing to meet other
criteria.

Affiliated members are granted designated privileges as

determined by Association bylaws and are represented at the conven
tion by a single delegate.

Finally, duly elected corresponding mem

bers are institutions or nonprofit organizations who receive NCAA
publications and mailings, but are otherwise not entitled to any
membership privileges (NCAA Manual, 1995-96).

Today, there are over

800 universities, colleg�s, and organizations that have one of the
preceding types of NCAA memberships (Sperber, 1990).
The internal administrative structure of the NCAA was rather
uncomplicated at its inception.

It simply consisted

of a presi

dent, vice-president, secretary-treasure, and an Executive Committee
with four representatives from four geographic districts of the cou
ntry.

By 1922, the number of districts had doubled as had the size

of the committee.

The Executive Committee, from that point on, be

came known as the Council of the NCAA.

Moreover, in 1922 constitu

tional revisions eliminated the one vice-president in favor of eight
vice-presidents, each of whom was charged with observing and super
vising the conduct of intercollegiate sports (Lawrence, 1987).

The

Council of the NCAA, now the governing body of the association, sub
sequently formed a new Executive Committee.

Presently, the Council

of the NCAA is comprised of forty-four individuals, typically ath
letic directors, while the Executive Committee is comprised of
twelve members (Sperber, 1990).
Having established an operational Football Rules Committee as
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well as having begun the tedious task of internal organization, the
NCAA sought to augment its newfound support by standardizing the
rules of other collegiate sports.

From 1908 on, the NCAA establish

ed rules committees in sports such as basketball (1908), wrestling
(1917), gymnastics (1927), golf (1935) and others (Lawrence, 1987).
As years passed, the NCAA began considering player eligibility, sch
eduling, inducements schools could offer athletes, as well as ques
tions pertaining to the regulation and enforcement of the rules it
created.
Regulation and Enforcement
The NCAA did not become a regulatory body over night.

During

the early years it became evident many schools were ignoring NCAA
rules.

In 1929, the NCAA issued the Carnegie Foundation Report

which documented:

"rampant professionalism, commercialization, and

exploitation that were corrupting virtually all aspects of inter
collegiate athletics" (Farrell, 1989, p. 8).

The NCAA called a Con

ference of Conferences on July 22, 1946, to discuss the effects the
end of World War II would have on college athletics. However, debate
at the meeting centered mainly on whether or not the NCAA had the
authority to require members to obey its regulations.

The meeting

produced the first draft of a statement the NCAA entitled "Princi
ples for the Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics" or the Sanity
Code (Lawrence, 1987; Shea & Wieman, 1967).

The Principles for the

Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics was informally referred to as
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the "Sanity Code", because the Principles were designed to return
the "sanity" which many believed had left college sports.
Besides establishing guidelines for a number of issues in
intercollegiate sports, the code attempted to punish those guilty of
certain violations by declaring athletes ineligible for play and/or
discontinuing the membership of the violating institution (Shea &
Wieman, 1967).

Officially adopted in 1948, and enforced by a three

member Compliance Committ�e, the Sanity Code was put to several
tests over the ensuing years. The NCAA's initial charge of code vio
lation against the University of Virginia in 1949, and the subse
quent charges of seven institutions in 1950, centered primarily on
section four of the Sanity Code which prohibited the allocation of
excessive financial aid to athletes.

Because delegates at the NCAA

convention failed to produce a two-thirds vote in favor of member
ship termination, each school was simply classified a "member not in
good standing" (Lawrence, 1987).
These and other failed attempts at regulation led the NCAA to
address several questions regarding the Sanity Code, chiefly issues
concerning institutional compliance of the code, termination of in
stitution memberships as the only sanction for non-compliance, and
the NCAA's general inability to effectively deal with presumed vio
violators.

Because of these and other problems, the Sanity Code was

killed by the NCAA delegation in 1951, though, the Compliance Committee, with no rules to enforce, was left intact.
In spite of the failure of the Sanity Code, the NCAA's goal of
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securing a firm grasp on the business of regulating college ath- •
letics was not abandoned.

In 1952, the NCAA delegation replaced the

Compliance Committee with a Membership Committee empowered to re
ceive complaints concerning member institutions as well as investi
gate and charge institutions with failure to meet academic and/or
athletic standards (Lawrence, 1987).
A subcommittee was additionally formed to help strengthen re
gulations in regard to enforcement.

This subcommittee, later to be

come the Committee on Infractions, implemented a twelve-point pro
gram designed to rid college sports of the abuses which had taken
over.

The plan limited the number of financial grants to student

athletes, directed recruiting activity, penalized athletes receiv
ing gifts or excessive aid, and eliminated lavish entertainment of
recruits (Lawrence, 1987).
By the end of 1952, the NCAA had imposed penalties on the
University of Kentucky and Bradley University for recruiting viola
tions in basketball, moves that caused Kentucky to cancel its 19521953 season.

It was not until this period in time, the early 1950s,

that the NCAA was seen as the "generally recognized enforcer of am
ateurism in intercollegiate sports" (Lawrence, 1987, p. 3).

Indeed,

between June 1, 1952, and December 22, 1965, the Infractions Commit
tee of the NCAA influenced and/or dealt with the outcomes of 449
suspected infractions of member schools (Shea & Wieman, 1967).
During the 1960s and 1970s the popularity of NCAA athletics
soared, notably due to exposure and money brought by television.

12
With the substantial increase in revenue, many colleges and univer
sities turned to illegal means of securing players who might lead to
championships.

Changing high school transcripts and cash induce

ments were maneuvers that were not uncommon.

This was particularly

true for black athletes who tended to be less academically prepared
and financially not as self sufficient as their white counterparts
(Farrell, 1989).
During the 1980s college sports continued to grow, in particu
lar men's football and basketball.

Schools making either bowl game

or final four appearances could typically expect revenues in excess
of a million dollars.

Although the popularity of the NCAA was at an

all time high, attention often shifted to the continuing ills of its
sports: altering transcripts, illegal payments, and credits for
classes never attended (Farrell, 1989; Simon, 1985; Sperber, 1990).
With such activity commonplace, the NCAA set out to return the
integrity that many believed had abandoned college sports.

Though

many of the advocates of Propositions 48 and 42 had hopes the rule
changes would improve the integrity of college sports, much of the
opposition believed the rules would lead only to the creation of
further ills.
The preceding history of intercollegiate athletics, from its
early days to the present, illustrates how today's primary agent of
social control in intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA, came into ex
istence.

As well, the history has provided a context for the crea

tion of additional rules by the NCAA.

However, before describing
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the framework from which this study will be guided, three key issues
in the sociology of sport which encompass the NCAA's creation of
rules 48 and 42 must be addressed.
Sociology of Sport Issues
In order to examine the social processes respecting the crea
tion of the two proposals, the subject matter must be explored in
concert with the sociology of sport.

Although scholarly literature

regarding Propositions 48 and 42 is somewhat meager, a wealth of
literature relating to the two rules does exist in the sociology of
sport.

(Relatively little sociological research exists which spe

cifically pertains to Propositions 48 and 42.

For the most part,

the rules are briefly mentioned in discussions of sport and educa
tion, racism in sport, and standardized testing.

Furthermore, spe

cific research that does exist on eligibility requirements has main
ly been conducted by the NCAA.

For example, Benson (1991) investi

gated the validity of NCAA eligibility standards for students
athletes admitted in the 1984-1985 class using as a measure the five
year graduation rates of the freshmen admitted.)

The significant

issues which factor into the creation of Proposals 48 and 42 in
clude: sport and educational attainment, racial discrimination in
sport, and the reliability of predicting academic success.
Sport and Education
For the purpose of this study, relevant issues concerning
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sport and education include: the aspirations, expectations, and aca
demic performance of active student-athletes, as well as the second
ary educational achievement of entering student-athletes.

In their

study of the Tulsa University basketball program, Adler and Adler
(1985) revealed that "although most college athletes ultimately be
come disillusioned with and detached from academics, many begin
their college careers idealistically, caring about academics and in
tending to graduate" (p. --241).
Adler and Adler refer to this as pragmatic detachment, meaning
the weight of structural conditions athletes encounter often ini
tiates the disillusionment of the academic ideal.

These findings

are consistent with studies of the collegiate athletic experience
that have found negative relationships between athletic participa
tion and academic ideals, taking into account a variety of factors
such as lower standards, reduced expectations, allegiance to coach
es, and length of season (Edwards, 1984; Messner & Groisser, 1982;
Purdy, Eitzen, & Hufnagel, 1982).
Indicators that are often used in the appraisal of the actual
academic performance of college athletes include grades, course se
lection, graduation rates, and interscholastic preparation.

Eitzen

(1987), in a review of data taken from the NCAA, several institu
tions, the media, and the work of social scientists, found male ath
letes to have lower GPAs than male non-athletes, black athletes to
have lower GPAs than white athletes, and male athletes lower GPAs
than female athletes.

Significant relationships were also found be-
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tween athletes involved in revenue sports as opposed to nonrevenue
sports, where revenue sport participants had lower GPAs.
In addition to this research on the academic under-performance
of college athletes, evidence exists that clustering takes place in
easy majors, in remedial classes, and so called "Palm Trees 101"
courses (Sperber, 1990).

Eitzen (1987) reports:

Clustering is most likely to occur: (1) in Division I pro
grams; (2) on male teams; (3) among blacks rather than whites;
(4) in big-time programs (ranked in the top 20 teams in the
past three years); and (5) in the academically elite schools
(p. 20).
Given the implementation of Proposition 48 in 1986 and Proposition
42 in 1990, and the general tendency of athletic personnel to moni
tor those adrift in the athletic subculture, it can be seen how visions of eligibility could conceivably overshadow sensibility in ed
ucational decision making on the part of students and their mentors
(Pitts, 1992).

In essence, educational decisions made by the men

tors of Proposition 48 students would, no doubt, assure second year
eligibility.
Another indicator of student-athlete academic achievement is
graduation rates.

Research in this area is ample although divergent

depending upon any one specific variable.

For example, Shapiro

(1984), in a study of Michigan State athletes from 1950-1970, found
graduation rates for athletes exceeded those of the non-athlete pop
ulation.

The graduation rates for football players even exceeded

those for non-athletes.

However, based on the data from 1950-1970,

Shapiro found that graduation rates for athletes were trending down,
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while rates for non-athletes were trending up.

Similarly, Eitzen

(1987) indicated that the more big-time a sport at an institution,
the lower the graduation rates of the student-athletes, for both men
and women, tend to be.
Unlike Shapiro's study, many schools presently have quite dis
mal student-athlete graduation rates.

This is often indicated by

measuring the graduation rates of professional athletes and indivi
dual school rates.

For example, Eitzen (1987) reports that in 1984

only 20% of the National Basketball Association players had gradu
ated, as opposed to 62% in 1974.

Other distinguishing numbers in

clude the graduation rates of big-time basketball programs such as
Memphis State and Nevada-Las Vegas, where from 1972 to 1982 gradua
tion rates were 10.7% and 21.3% respectively

(Eitzen, 1987).

The final variable associated with academic success in college
is interscholastic preparation.

Purdy, Eitzen, and Hufnagel (1982)

found that high-school athletes offered full scholarships for ath
letic participation tended to be less prepared for the academic rig
ors of college than the general student population.

This was deter

mined by comparing the college graduation rates and GPAs of athletes
to the graduation rates and GPAs of the general student population
at Colorado State University over a ten year period.

Colorado State

is classified by the NCAA as Division I-A school and it is recogniz
ed as having one of the nations big-time sports programs.
In addition to this research, Eitzen (1987) indicates that
male athletes are less prepared for college than male non-athletes

17
and black athletes are less prepared for college than white ath
letes.

The relationship between male athletes and non-athletes is

significant, especially when taking into consideration research by
Hauser and Lueptow (1978) that revealed high school athletes typi
cally have higher GPAs than high school non-athletes.
The divergence in academic performance on the part of high
school and college athletes is most notably due to the differing
roles assumed at each level of sport participation.

Eitzen and Sage

(1986) point out that unlike interscholastic sport participation,
which is associated with status among peers, "intercollegiate sports
participation typifies a relationship between coach and athlete
which is essentially that of employer and employee" (p. 123).

In

essence, academics suffer in college because of the allegiance, ty
pically meaning time, student-athletes must accord to coaches.
Sport and Racial Discrimination
A common belief persists that the one social institution in
the United States that has remained uninhibited by racism would be
that of sport.

However, we should recall that the exclusion of

blacks from professional sports did not desist until the end of
World War II with Jackie Robinson's dramatic shattering of the color
barrier in professional baseball.

Even at the intercollegiate level

blacks had remained segregated (Eitzen & Sage, 1986).

Misconcep

tions underlying the race issue in sport generally revolve around
the fact that the numbers of black athletes presently participating
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in the 'big three' U.S. team sports are disproportionate to the per
centage of blacks in the population.
Though racial discrimination in sport is not a new phenomenon
by any means, its study in concert with the sociology of sport has
become increasingly prevalent in recent years.

Several studies of

racial discrimination on both the intercollegiate and professional
levels of sport have focused on such topics as stacking of positions
in team sports, position �ssignrnent based upon commonly held ster
eotypes, athletic rewards, as well as the dearth of black coaches,
athletic directors, and executives for varying sports on all levels
(Edwards, 1984; Eitzen & Yetman, 1977; Jones, Leonard II, Schmitt,
Smith, & Tolone 1987; Williams & Youssef, 1975).
As mentioned previously, the relationship between Propositions
48 and 42 and racial discrimination lies in the use of standardized
tests as a means for ascertaining academic aptitude, which ultimate
ly determines athletic eligibility or ineligibility.

Standardized

testing has been labeled patently racist by several college presi
dents and civil rights leaders who argue the tests are culturally
biased in favor of upper-class whites (Lederman, 1989; Swift, 1994;
Zingg, 1983).

Hence, protestations of racial discrimination by the

opposition of Propositions 48 and 42 lie partly in their belief that
minorities, particularly black athletes, are systematically excluded
from an education and athletics by the use of culturally biased
tests (Chaney, 1988).
Edwards (1984), Nibbrig & Cottingham (1986), and Zingg (1983)
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all agree that the substantive issue at stake is fair access to ach
ievement and that scoring 700 on the SAT does not necessarily guar
antee degree attainment or post-enrollment college matriculation.
Gladwell (1986) believes all the requirements "do is penalize ath
letes for their high school records while doing nothing to improve
their athletes' education once they have entered college" (p. 48).
Edwards (1984) additionally states a minimum score was arbitrarily
incorporated into Proposition 48 with no reasoned or logical explan
ation given by the NCAA, and if anything, the standards set by the
rule were too low.

The American Council on Education states a score

of 700 on the SAT projects less than a fifty-fifty chance of gradu
ating from most division I schools.
Predicting Academic Success
Much of the controversy surrounding the vote on Proposal 48 in
1983 centered on the use of standardized tests as a predictor for
academic success in a university type setting.

Standardized testing

has not been an issue completely ignored in the realm of higher edu
cation.

However, it is no surprise to see the issue further kindled

with the enactment of Propositions 48 and 42, especially when ath
letic revenue at many institutions is, at least partially, contin
gent on the eligibility and admission of potential blue chip ath
letes.
The research on the use of standardized tests as a means for
predicting success in higher education is abundant.

However, re-
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search focusing on the nature of the relationship between standard
ized tests and potential NCAA athletes is sparse.

The material pre

sented here examines entire student populations, rather than simply
athletes.
The positions and views concerning standardized tests are dissimilar.

Charles V. Willie (1987), in his call for excellence and

equity in higher education, states that the United States, in its
continual uphill climb towards excellence, is fundamentally concern
ed with how to exclude rather than how to include individuals.

Wil-

lie (1987) points out that
by educating the brightest and the best in the presence of
those who are less able, no harm is done to students who are
excellent if we develop pedagogical arrangements wherein ex
cellent students can assist their less able classmates (p.
489).
Willie calls for an end to the silly business of excluding minori
ties by way of standardized aptitude tests and invites equity and
fairness.

He states:

"we know an equitable system (rather than a

system based on excellence) has a better chance of surviving" (p.
489).

Willie does not, however, describe of what such a system

might consist.
Goldman and Hewitt (1976), in their discussion of predictors
of academic success, state that merely "eliminating educational selection tests is no solution at all.

Even if no tests are used, ad

mission standards must still be made, and the issue of unfair selection would continue to exist" (p. 116).
In addition, Goldman and Hewitt (1976) found that, in general,
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the college GPAs of whites are more validly predicted by the com
bined use of high school GPAs and SAT scores than are the college
GPAs of blacks.

To alleviate this discrepancy Goldman and Hewitt

suggested developing highly valid predictors for blacks, a solution
easier said than done.

And as then Supreme Court Justice Douglas

suggested, such a solution may serve to create racial barriers ra
ther than eliminate them (Goldman & Hewitt, 1976, p. 116).
To increase further the confusion surrounding the issue of
standardized tests let me turn to an essay by White (1985) summar
izing the significant finding presented in two separate books writ
ten by a Harvard Graduate, David Owen, and Harvard Professor Robert
Klitgaard.

To determine the success of the SAT in predicting the

academic success of black students and gain a better understanding of
testing bias, Owen questioned three Educational Testing Service
officials regarding testing prejudice.
The first official noted black students tend to do better in
college than SAT scores predict.

The second indicated SAT tests are

not biased either for or against blacks.

The third indicated blacks

tended to do worse than what SAT scores generally predict (Owen, as
cited in White, 1986).
Owen, in his own assessment of the SAT, questioned how student
ability can effectively be measured if the measure for ability can
not accurately account for the difference between knowing and not
knowing the nature of a test question, based on economic backgrounds,
and different educational, cultural, and social opportunities (Owen,
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as cited in White, 1986).

Disagreeing with Owen, Klitgaard believes

the academic ability of the student body is diluted by admissions
policies that admit minority students with lower standardized scores.
However, both agree that minorities are admitted in spite of their
scores, not because of them; and given a color-blind approach to ad
missions policies there would be fewer minorities in selective
schools, including minority athletes.
Predicting individual academic success by means of standardiz
ed testing is a very controversial issue.

While many argue that the

culturally biased tests should be eliminated in order for achieved
equity in higher education, many disagree, contending that the tests
are necessary for predicting a student's potential for academic suc
cess.

When put in the context of athletic eligibility for freshmen

student-athletes, as this issue will be, the matter becomes all the
more disputable.
The preceding issues; sport and education, sport and racial
discrimination, and the use of standardized tests, all must be con
sidered when examining the creation of rules 48 and 42.

Much of the

contention and controversy surrounding the creation and implementa
tion of the rules revolves around these issues.

However, in order

to examine such a process, an appropriate framework for explaining
such a process needs to be introduced.
Social Constructionism
A social constructionist framework, found in the definitional
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paradigm was adopted for this study.

The definitional paradigm from

which social constructionism is derived "emphasizes people as acting
upon their world, and the research goal is that of describing the
processes through which the subject (people) constructs the social
world" (Thomas, 1982, p. 294).

Working within such a paradigm, the

processes by which laws (rules) are created and enforced must be un
derstood (Kramer, 1985).
The social constructionist perspective is appropriate for our
study of rules 48 and 42 because it limits value inclinations and
subjective notions that the sociologist may hold in regard to the
creation of rules.

Furthermore, by employing a contextual social

constructionist framework, it will be revealed that the creation of
the rules was not a result of a single determinant, but rather due
to a number of issues which encompass questions of racism, power
relationships, institutional values, and individual sensitivities
(Zingg, 1983).
Contextual Constructionism
Contextual constructionists focus on the dialectic of society
and argue for a contextually natured interpretation of claims mak
ing.

Claims making refers to actions made by one party to another

demanding something be done about some putative condition (Spector &
Kitsuse, 1977).

Miller and Holstein (1993) suggest that contextual

constructionists "treat the evaluation of social problems claims as
an important part of their analyses" (p. 8).

In essence, social re-
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searchers using a contextual constructionist framework examine the
social organization of claims, procedures, resources, practices, and
accomplishments of the claims makers.
This examination of social processes, as Berger and Luckmann
(1966) suggest, is carried out in three movements.

The first move

ment is externalization, "the process by which people construct a
cultural product," the world in which we live.

The second movement

is objectivation, whereby �ultural products take on an objective
reality.

The final movement is internalization, a means by which

individuals, through socialization, internalize objective facts and
make them "part of their own 'internal' consciousness" (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966, p. 61).

This process, while acknowledging human

authorship of reality through claims making practices, also allows
for the interpretation of the circumstances regarding a cultural
product.

Best (1993) believes, "we will understand the empirical

world better if we pay attention to the manner in which social pro
blems emerge" (p. 119).
Because this study will assess conditions that affect the
claims making process and due to the fact that these claims, to an
extent, will be (contextually) evaluated, the contextual construct
ionist approach will be employed.

By utilizing this approach, we

will be in a position to better understand the manner in which cer
tain social problems (rules restricting freshmen eligibility) come
to exist and others do not.

As well, this approach will increase

understanding of rule creating processes in general.
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A Natural History Model
Within the definitional paradigm different techniques can be
used to understand and interpret the emergence and development of
social problems.

Historical investigations are one means of accom-

plishing such a task.

Historical investigations direct researchers

to organize data over time and to use models that reflect the con
ception of society as an ongoing social process (Wohl, 1975).

By

utilizing such a model, social researchers are able to analyze unique sequences of events that link with each other to form natural
histories.

A natural history model will be employed to understand

better the emergence and development of the problems that led to the
implementation of Rules 48 and 42.
The model that will be utilized in this study was developed by
Herbert Blumer (1971).

Blumer insists that the emergence, the ca

reer, and the fate of social problems is dependent on the process of
collective definition, a process which passes through five identifiable stages which Blumer (1971) labels:

1. The emergence of social problems.
2. The legitimation of the problem.
3. The mobilization of action.

4. The formation of an official plan.
5. The implementation of an official plan. (p. 301)
However, it should be noted that in order for social situations to
gain respectability or attain the status of a social problem, they
must be successfully navigated through each of the before-mentioned
stages, stages which both Blumer (1971) and Spector and Kitsuse
(1977) indicate are very contingent and problematic stages.

That
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is, social problems often terminate or cease to exist because of
failure moving from one stage of the natural history to the succeed
ing stage (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977).

Adapting Blumer's stages will

reveal the social process respecting the emergence of problems which
necessitated Propositions 48 and 42.

It should be noted that Blum

er's stages are merely a model for the natural history, and only one
model that can be used.

Dissimilar models have been developed by

Bossard (1941) and Fuller & Myers (1941).
Theoretical Perspectives on Sport
Having reviewed the relevant sociology of sport literature as
well as having introduced a theoretical framework which shall guide
this study, we now turn to two theoretical perspectives that will be
used to interpret the creation of the proposals:
and cartel theory.

critical theory,

The critical theory discussed here pertains to

sports in general and therefore must be applied to Propositions 48
and 42.

Cartel theory, an economic theory, has previously been as

sociated with the NCAA and its rules.

These two theoretical per

spectives, when applied in Chapter IV, will aid in the contextual
analysis of the proposals.
A Critical Perspective on Sport
For the most part, critical sociologists have maintained a do
cile, perhaps opportunistic silence on the subject of sport.

This

is most notably due to the working class' fanatical enjoyment of
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sport, a fact, which until recently, has effectively stifled criti
cal voices (Brohm, 1978).

However, with the increase in the commo

dification of sport, the necessity for a critical critique or as
sessment has become apparent (Chorbajian, 1985).
Critical theorists are interested in examining "the material
and symbolic relationships between power, social control, and ac
tions which resist control" (Pfohl, 1994, p. 404).

They further

encourage us to move away from hierarchical structures of power and
strive for equality.

Labeling theory and pluralistic conflict the

ory have been very influential in the development of critical
thought.

Labeling theory has had significant influence on critic

al perspectives primarily because those with power typically have
the greatest ability to label.
Similarly, pluralistic conflict theory asserts that a large
number of groups vie for the power to decide what is legally prohib
ited.

To the winner goes the spoils, or the power to decide on what

is legally prohibited (Pfohl, 1995).

The major contribution plural

istic conflict theory has had to the critical perspectives is that
historically, conflict theory played a significant role "in the dem
ystification of what had been the more generally accepted view that
law was consensually created and implemented with 'value neutral
ity"' (Pfohl, 1994, p. 430).

Though pluralistic theory fails to

take into account factors such as historically based structural con
texts, it does recognize that human struggle for power inevitably
results in triumph for the powerful and the perpetual degeneration
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and deviantization of the powerless (Pfohl, 1994).
In that regard, Chorbajian (1985) believes the primary goal of
critical sociologists interested in sport ought to be the vigorous
examination of those individuals associated with sport as well as
the empowerment and political enfranchisement of people for liberating causes.

Chorbajian (1985) tells us that

considerable work remains to be done documenting the organiza
tion and operation of sport. We need information of a power
elite nature--who are the owners of sport; what are the in
terlocks among owners, the media, and the political structure.
(p. 65)
Indeed, this study will attempt to address some of the issues
brought up by Chorbajian so as to understand the power elite of
the NCAA.
Cartel Theory
Economic theories are sometimes overlooked by sociologists be
cause the theories frequently dismiss non-economic factors.

How

ever, the creation of Propositions 48 and 42 can be interpreted using the economic principle of a business cartel.

Though cartel

theory does not entirely dismiss all non-economic factors, the pri
mary points of emphasis in its analysis of any particular phenomenon
are of an economic nature.
Koch (1983) tells us that a cartel is "an organization of in
dividuals who collude, conspire and agree upon matters of joint in
terest" (p. 361).

Classic examples of cartels would be Major League

Baseball and the National Football League (Stieber, 1991).

Here,
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draft systems prevent bidding, which in turn restrict competition
and suppress wages.
Cartels do not simply appear, they evolve over time. The first
step in the formation of a cartel is the establishment of an assoc
iation in which producers can meet and exchange information.

Using

this mechanism, producers can communicate and institute collective
action for alleviating common or recurring problems.

Over time,

competition is restricted and membership opportunities are tighten
ed, thereby cutting costs and increasing profits.

The result is in

creased profits propel producers to cartelize or continue to re
strict competition in order to maintain and increase financial rewards (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992; Koch, 1983; Lawrence,
1987).

The five structural factors that are most important in the

formation of a cartel include:

"high concentration of production,

high barriers to entry, a small fringe, nonsubstitutability, and
nondifferentiation" (Spar, 1994, p. 4).

Parenthetically, fringe re

fers to the number of significant outside producers, that is, pro
ducers who are not large enough to be considered members of the car
tel but who nevertheless contribute a not insignificant portion of
the total market production.
Maintenance of the cartel itself is the fundamental goal of
any cartel. A leading reason why cartels disintegrate is dissimilar
ity of interests of cartel members, usually associated with a diver
gence in revenue (Koch, 1983).

When needed, cartels will initiate a

specific course of action to prevent the disintegration of the car-
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tel. As will be seen in the following pages, the NCM has in recent
years enacted different courses of action, such as Propositions 48
and 42,

to maintain the NCM cartel.

Rules like these are created

not only for the equalization of member competition, but as well for
the joint revenue maximization of the NCM's members.
Both of these approaches, critical theory and cartel theory,
will be employed when examining rules 48 and 42.

The purpose of us

ing two theories for analysis is not to specify one approach as su
perior to the other, but rather examine the dual explanations for
the creation and implementation of Propositions 48 and 42.

Before

closing this introductory chapter, the methods utilized in this
study will be briefly elaborate upon.
Methods
The research design selected is a case study, approached as a
socio-historical text analysis.

Yin states (1984) "A case study is

an empirical inquiry that; investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly defined" (p. 23).

Furthermore, Hamel,

Dufour, and Fortin (1993) state the goal of a case study is "to
reconstruct and analyze a case from a sociological perspective" (p.
1).

Case studies are used by sociologists to make detailed ac
counts of some phenomenon.

Kramer (1978) indicates that case stud

ies typically address specific questions.

Such questions include,
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but are not limited to, the following.
1. Out of what has the phenomenon come?
2. What are the major features of the phenomenon? and
3. What are the results, outcomes, or effects of the phenomenon?
To address these questions with regard to the present case
study of NCAA rules, a socio-historical approach will be implement
ed.

Data pertaining to Propositions 48 and 42 will be taken from

the media and NCAA proceedings, be documented, and then contextually
interpreted.
According to Skocpol (1984), socio-historical studies exhibit
the following qualities:

they inquire as to time and space contexts

of social arrangements, "take temporal sequences seriously in ac
counting for outcomes,"

they recognize the relationship between ac

tion and structural contexts, and highlight "particular and varying
features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of
change" (p. 1).

Skocpol (1984) further indicates there are no re

cipes for correct methodology in historical studies; moreover, "it
is a mistake to tie historical sociology down to any one epistemo
logical, theoretical, or methodological orientation" (p. 361).

The

social constructionist perspective that I have adopted for this
study is, in essence a historical study, because it examines rule
creating social processes and the history of the social process.
Skocpol (1984) mentions three approaches to socio-historical
methodology which may be utilized in case study research.

In the
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first approach, a researcher may apply a single theoretical model to
historical events.

However, a danger is often found in this ap

proach in that specific historical cases may be selected out to fit
a specific theory.

The second approach involves a more inductive

approach by which alternative hypotheses are analyzed in conjunction
with regularities in historical cases.

The utilization of this ap

proach may also be dangerous, for the use of such investigative tec
hniques often generates contradictory and atheoretical assumptions,
thereby limiting the relevance of any given historical instance.

In

other words, the approach confines reasonable theoretical explana
tions or restricts the sociological vision of the researcher.
The final strategy represents the middle ground between the
previous two approaches.

This approach is significant for our pur

poses because it focuses on "the culturally embedded intentions of
individual or group actors in the given historical settings," as
well as on culturally and politically significant topics (Skocpol,
1984, p. 368).

Indeed, this research is to be driven by the tenet

that many conditions factored into or played a key part in the un
folding social process that spawned rules 48 and 42.

Though some

danger does lie in thii approach, such as lack of sociological vis
ion, it is the safest of the three strategies, because it utilizes a
variety of concepts to develop interpretations regarding the given
historical patterns.
Skocpol insists that secondary data analysis is the method of
choice for interpretative sociological research.

She contends that
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in the circumstance of historical sociology "a dogmatic insistence
on redoing primary research for every investigation would be disas
trous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research" (p.
382).
By employing contemporary data taken from the mainstream media
(e.g., Time, Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, The Sporting News, The
New Republic, and The New York Times, etc.), in addition to supple
mentary sources taken dir�ctly from the NCAA (i.e., reports, intern
al studies, convention proceedings, and manuals), the creation and
implementation of rules 48 and 42 will be further understood.

CHAPTER II
PREFACING PROPOSITION 48:

THE EMERGENCE AND NATURE OF SOCIAL CLAIMS

To reiterate the assertion of Spector and Kitsuse (1977), the
central problem of a social problems theory "is to account for the
emergence, nature, and maintenance of claims-making and responding
activities" (p. 76).

The�purpose of this chapter is to decipher and

examine the circumstances which encompassed the inception and intro
duction of Proposition 48 into intercollegiate athletics.

In es

sence, we seek to contextually examine the social problems claims
which inferred NCAA member institutions as lacking academic integ
rity, claims which became in part responsible for the creation of
and the controversy surrounding Proposition 48.
Proposition 48:

A Prelude

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the popularity of in
tercollegiate sports soared in the 198Os.

With such high regard for

college sports and the greater numbers of dollars at stake for each
athletic contest, it was no surprise that the competition for
student-athletes became fierce.

In order to stay with or ahead of

the athletic competition, many colleges and universities known for
their academic virtuosity felt they were left with no real choice
but to sometimes recruit athletes who fell below the school's own
admission standards.

Even today, academically superior institutions
34
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still recruit significant numbers of substandard student-athletes.
This is often illustrated by comparing the academic performance of
athletic populations with the academic performance of non-athletic
populations at academically renown institutions where athletics are
also very prominent. Hence, it has, in part, been the academic under
performance of athletes at many academically competitive schools
that has perpetuated public perceptions of lacking academic integ
rity in college athletics: These perceptions represent social claims
by the public in regard to the state of affairs of NCAA athletics.
The ideal means of restoring academic integrity, so to speak,
would to simply have institutions enforce the admissions require
ments they have on the books for all students, thus making athletes
meet the same standards as any other student seeking entrance to the
institution (Sack, 1986).

However, this would pose significant pro

blems for athletic programs at academically competitive schools, for
they could no longer recruit blue-chip athletes who are merely mar
ginal students.

Sack (1986) succinctly describes the reality such

requirements would pose:
Academically competitive schools like Notre Dame and Michigan
would no longer be athletic powers, and less selective state
universities would corner the market on blue-chip athletes,
as well as on national championships. Overall, the quality of
play would suffer and commercial college sport, as we know it,
would probably not survive. (p. SlO)
Given this scenario, the NCAA, during the 1970s and early
1980s, did not find it reasonable nor feasible to make academic integrity a foremost priority.

However, many academically renown in

stitutions such as Duke, Notre Dame, and Virginia did prescribe
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their own academic standards which athletes were required to meet
(Adler, 1989; Cramer, 1986; Sansoff, 1985).
Ultimately, the NCAA decided reform of an academic nature was
indeed in order.

Many NCAA members believed a reform was needed

that would improve the overall character of intercollegiate sports
as well as eliminate the cut-throat recruiting of marginal to inferior students.

Hence, these decisions represent the initial social

claims by the NCAA respecting the state of affairs in intercolleg
iate sports just prior to 1983 NCAA convention.

The NCAA came to

the conclusion that without any type of reform to monitor athletic
recruitment, schools would be liable to succumb to their own worst
instincts in the realm of recruiting.

One university president al-

luded to the enactment of Proposition 48 to Cramer (1986):
Without this reform, we are caught. If we take the high road
and don't admit the academically deficient seven-foot basket
ball player, he'll sign with Clemson or some other school. And
so our team not only doesn't get a star player, but we have to
play against him for the next four years. (p. KS)
Hence, Proposition 48 emerged because of social claims respecting public perceptions surrounding the academic integrity of
NCAA athletes as well as claims made by the NCAA regarding recruit
ing practices.

Indeed, the NCAA had reached a crossroads.

Either

face the downward spiral of recruiting academically unfit athletes
and turning colleges and universities into complete jock factories,
or introduce reform which would attempt to return the student to
student-athlete and even the recruiting playing field.
Alluding to Blumer's (1971) natural history model of social
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problems, we have seen both the emergence and legitimation of a so
cial problem, where collective definition has occurred on both the
part of the public and the NCAA itself.

The legitimation of the so

cial problem, institutions lacking academic integrity, did not occur
immediately after the problem's emergence, rather the contingency
period between these two stages was fairly prolonged.

However, once

the problem was legitimated, the natural history proceeded to unfold
rather rapidly.

Meaning,-once the problem of institutions lacking

academic integrity was legitimated, the contingency periods between
each of the subsequent stages became rather brief, much like the
very stages themselves.

In essence, problems of athletically re

nowned institutions lacking academic integrity and problems of cut
throat recruiting emerged over a great number of years.

The pro

blems were then legitimized by the public and the NCAA in the years
prior to the creation of Proposition 48.
The following two stages, mobilization of action and formation
of an official plan, came in direct succession with little or no
contingency between the two stages (Blumer, 1971).

In January of

1983, the NCAA held its annual convention in San Diego, California,
to discuss, among other things, freshmen eligibility for participa
tion in college sports at Division I institutions (Zingg, 1983).
However, during the convention, which served as the primary mobil
ization of action period for the two problems, we see the originally
defined problem of institutional integrity redefined so as to spe
cifically confront freshmen eligibility.
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Proposition 48, introduced by L. Donald Smith, president of
Southern Methodist University and spokesman of an ad hoc committee
representing 40 superpower universities, was one of seven proposals
formed and submitted to tackle freshmen eligibility.

Representa

tives of the 277 Division I institutions of the NCAA voted to ap
prove rule 48 by an estimated 2:1 ratio, thereby establishing Pro
position 48 as NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(j), with an effective date of August
1, 1986 (Wiley, 1991; Zingg, 1983).
At the 1983 convention it became clear on what lines propo
nents and opponents of the new rule differed: chiefly black and
white.

Dissension centered primarily on the use of standardized

tests as an eligibility criteria for athletic participation; tests,
which as mentioned previously, are questioned because of the eco
nomic, educational, and cultural differences of test takers (Swift,
1994).

Protests of racism and pre-meditated discrimination from

representatives of the black community soon followed (Cramer, 1986;
Edwards, 1983; Gladwell, 1986).
Though approved at the 1983 convention, Proposition 48 was
still three years away from official implementation.

This period

represents the final contingency point before reaching the final
stage in the social problem's natural history, that stage being the
official implementation of the plan of action.

Ironically, much of

the debate that occurred between the proponents and opponents of the
rule occurred after the initial vote, though before official imple
mentation of the plan.

This is somewhat contradictory of Blumer's
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(1977) model which indicates the debating and redefining of a social
problem occurs during "the formation of an official plan" period (p.
305).

It is during this increasingly vehement contingency period

that coaches, athletic directors, college presidents, and black
leaders gave both vigorous and impassioned arguments for and against
the use of Rule 48.
Points of Contention
Indeed between 1983 and the year of Rule 48's implementation,
1986, and even leading up to the adoption of Proposition 42 in 1989,
an abundance of debate pertaining to the proposal unfolded.

Rather

than explain all the views of the proponents of Rule 48, then do the
same for the opponents, the following discussion will be conducted
issue by issue.

The issues addressed in the following represent not

only concerns over Rule 48, but the emergence and legitimation of
problems that would ultimately lead to the creation of Proposition
42.
The Nature of the SAT Score
There are many elements to Rule 48 that have been contended,
but the issue that has endured significant debate.has to do with the
use of SAT scores as admission standards for athletes.

Surprising

ly, the groups constituting the opposition to Rule 48 were those one
would think would be the most supportive of the measure.

The oppo

nents of the rule, chiefly civil rights leaders and black athletic
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directors and coaches, argued that a score of 700 on the SAT as a
minimum standard was arbitrarily established and that the enactment
of such a standard would unfairly exclude many black athletes from
higher education (Chaney, 1988; Edwards; 1983).

Neither the NCAA

nor the American Council on Education committee charged with devel
oping the rule gave any reasoned or logical explanation for the set
ting of the minimum score. According to Cramer (1986):
You'd think that forcing all college athletes to achieve a
relatively modest minimum level of academic achievement would
be an idea embraced by almost everyone--that few right-minded
folks would argue with the notion that minimums could and
should be met. Because black athletes are often said to be
exploited by big-time college programs, you'd think that black
educators would be leaders in the push for these reforms. (p.
KS)
There were some black administrators and educators who were
fully supportive of the measure and believed standardized tests mea
sure certain skills that all students need to have in order to sueceed at competitive schools (Vrcan, 1987).

However, many black

leaders pointed to the fact that the average SAT score for blacks
entering college was only 722, and that 55% of blacks generally ac
quire a score lower than 700 on the test (Edwards, 1983).

Interest

ingly enough, Sperber (1990) notes that a NCAA study published prior
to the initial rule 48 debate stated
that if athletes entering college in 1977 had been subjected
to the [Proposal 48] requirements, a large number of those who
have now graduated, particularly black students, would not
have been eligible to participate in college athletics as
freshmen and possibly would not have gone to college at all.
(p. 220)
Moreover, in an interview with Fiske (1983), Alan Kirschner,
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director of research and government affairs for the United Negro
College Fund, stated that "if the standards adopted by the NCAA for
athletes were applied to our students, it would knock more than half
of them out of college" (p. All).

Additionally, he believed the

policy overlooked motivational factors that students often develop
once they reach a college.
Hence, the general consensus on the part of black leaders and
opponents of the rule 48 was that, in the NCAA's haste to devise an
official plan of action, they failed to take into consideration all
the ramifications such a plan would incur.

However true this may

be, many proponents do not believe it is reason enough to totally
discount using standardized tests.

Though the tests are not valid

predictors of innate intelligence, they are useful in that they do
give a rough idea of the educational background from which an indi
vidual has come.

In his support of admissions exams Sack (1986)

states:
A combined score of below 700 on the S.A.T. 's, for instance,
suggests that a student has either attended inferior schools
or comes from a neighborhood or family that lacks the material
and cultural resources to emphasize the development of skills
needed for success in college. Such a student may also have
spent more time and energy on sports than on school work while
in primary or secondary school. (p. All)
In essence, Sack believes standardized tests serve a fundamental objective in athletic recruiting, in spite of their deficien
cies.

That objective is the assurance and granting of athletic sch

olarships to those student-athletes who are both student and ath
lete.

Opponents retorted that barring marginal students from col-
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legiate athletics through the use of admissions exams still requires
that test minimums be established.
Eligibility and Stockpiling
Another issue which had opponents up in arms had to do with
the loss of one year of eligibility for partial qualifying athletes.
As mentioned before, partial qualifiers are those individuals meet
ing one, but not both, of�the two athletic eligibility requirements.
Partial qualifiers are required to sit out their freshmen year of
athletics so as to acclimate to college and concentrate on academ
ics.

Many opponents of this measure, particularly coaches and ath

letic directors, believe athletes or potential sports stars are be
ing punished prematurely.

They assert that because certain young

sters may fail to meet arbitrary test requirements they are being
denied a full college sports career, especially when athletes are
prohibited from even practicing with their teammates (Chaney, 1988).
Punishment or not, many educators criticized the new rule for
conveying no concern over post-enrollment matriculation.

In other

words, once the athlete is on a college campus, the rule has rela
tively little to do with the athlete's academic progress (Wieder,
1988).

Presently the NCAA has no rules preventing athletic competi

tion with a below C average, rather, "a student-athlete shall be in
good academic standing as determined by the academic authorities who
determine the meaning of such phrases for all students of the in
stitution" (1994-1995 NCAA Manual, p. 129).
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More radical reforms had been suggested as means of assuaging
this dispute, essentially the elimination of freshmen eligibility
altogether, or the extension of financial support from four years to
five (Sack, 1986; Zingg, 1983).

This would allow athletes a one

year adjustment period, if needed, at the same time protect a four
year athletic career.

However, during this point in time, 1983-

1986, many difficulties surrounded such reforms, mainly financial.
Likely or unlikely, such reforms would still be linked to standard
ized tests in that decisions would have to be made regarding an
athlete's eligibility for his or her first year of school (Zingg,
1983).
Yet another matter that divided proponents and opponents of
the rule, an issue which was influential in the creation of Proposi
tion 42, was that schools with substantial athletic budgets could
afford to grant scholarships to partial qualifiers, thereby stock
piling their rosters and preventing schools with meager athletic
budgets from procuring such talent (Sperber, 1990).

Additionally,

the rule allowed schools accepting partial qualifiers, as Gladwell
(1986) states, "to posture about academic excellence without actual
ly having to take any meaningful action" (p. 14).
Edwards (1983) indicates, Rule 48 was not so much a racist at
tempt to raise academic standards or so much an attempt by whites to
resegregate collegiate sports, but rather a means to achieve parity
between black and white institutions in the recruiting war.
(1983) continues:

Edwards
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The overwhelming majority of athletes recruited by tradition
ally black Division I schools are black, score below Rule 48
minimum-test-score requirements, and tend to need financial
support in order to attend college. However, because they
have far more modest athletic budgets than traditionally white
schools, traditionally black schools are not nearly so able to
provide financial support for both a roster of active athletes
and a long roster of newly recruited athletes ineligible for
athletic participation under Rule 48. (p. 35)
Conceived in this context, Proposition 48 represented not only the
NCAA's desire to regulate the recruitment process (control cut
throat recruiting), but, �s well, represented a fundamental reas
sertion of the NCAA's complete authority.

In essence, the initial

social claims of the NCAA regarding recruiting practices were seem
ingly rooted in NCAA ambitions of member school parity.
Privilege or Right?
One final issue which must be brought forth in this chapter
exemplifies, perhaps, the essence of the entire controversy.
college education a right or a privilege?

Is a

Chaney (1988) believes if

higher education is indeed a right, then universities should not
deny, via achievement tests, athletes the chance for education and
success, especially when universities are ready to exchange educational opportunity for athletic skill.
If higher education is privilege, the real issue becomes fair
access to achievement for all parties involved (Zingg, 1983).

Zingg

stresses that when fair access to achievement cannot be met, and
when students are admitted to institutions where academic success is
ill achieved, that is the period when exploitation of student-
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athletes is most likely to occur.

Zingg (1983) continues:

A student, no matter how talented cannot assume that an admis
sions offer--like education itself--is something done to him,
something accomplished on his behalf. By the same token, in
stitutions must recognize that the admissions process is in
timately linked to the educational one and that a special re
sponsibility is in order to reinforce this relationship with
the student-athlete. (p. 9)
Though not the focal point of this study, it should be understood
that individual attitudes respecting rule 48 are most likely to con
form to attitudes on educational opportunities in general.
Summary
This chapter has provided an examination of the emergence and
nature of claims making activities which propagated the creation of
Proposition 48. Claims of academic integrity and unethical recruit
ing practices were made by the public and the NCAA regarding the
state of affairs in college athletics.

Using Blumer's natural his

tory model I have described the unfolding social processes whereby
the differing claims were legitimized, acted upon, formulated into a
plan of action, and then implemented as rule 48.

Using the model

has also demonstrated how the emergence and legitimation of the so
cial claims was rather lengthy, and how the three ensuing stages
were rather precipitated.
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated how this particular
social problem is somewhat contradictory to Blumer's natural history
model.

In Blumer's (1971) model, debate over a plan of action, in-

eluding concessions, tradeoffs, and deference to influence, occurs

46

in the "formation of an official plan of action" stage (p. 306).

As

was the case with Proposition 48, the rule had already been passed
and was awaiting official implementation before any heated debate
ever began.

The major points of contention addressed prior to im

plementation were also examined in this chapter.
Before the official implementation of rule 48 further social
claims were being made with respect to the new rule and to potential
consequences of the rule.

The task in the following chapter will be

similar to this one, is that it will examine the inception of Pro
position 42, the social claims, and the controversy surrounding it.

CHAPTER III
THE CONTINUING SOCIAL PROCESS:

REVISING THE PLAN OF ACTION

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the social pro
cesses which led to the formulation of Proposition 48 continued to
evolve.

The social process progressed in such a way that modifica

tions to the original official plan of action were eventually in
duced.

Proposition 42, the ultimate result of this unfolding social

process, eliminated the partial qualifier loophole, thereby prevent
ing universities and colleges from offering athletic scholarships to
individuals meeting only one of the two freshmen eligibility condi
tions.

Much like the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to exam

ine the introduction and inception of Proposition 42, as well as ex
amine social claims which necessitated the induction of the modified
rule.

As with Proposition 48, a great amount of controversy sha

dowed Proposition 42.
The Domino Effect
At the 1989 NCAA Convention, preliminary indications respect
ing Proposition 48 were that of the students falling under the re
strictions, of which there were approximately 600 annually, most
were adapting comfortably to college (Sanoff & Witkin, 1989).

How

ever, these findings were only preliminary and gave no clear picture
as to whether Proposition 48 was a success or failure.
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Nonetheless,
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a new rule or modification of bylaw 5-1-(j), entitled Proposition
42, appeared on the convention ballot.

As before mentioned, Propo

sition 42 called for the refusal of athletic funding and the elim
ination of athletic eligibility for partial qualifiers.
The sequence of events leading up to the vote and approval of
Proposition 42 began long before the 1989 convention.

The emergence

of problems that eventually necessitated the creation of Proposition
42 can actually be traced t'o the University of Georgia the year
Proposition 48 went into effect, 1986 (Sanoff & Witkin, 1989).
At the University of Georgia it was found that academically
unqualified athletes were kept eligible by placement in remedial
programs which did not lead to degree attainment.

Soon after the

exposure of its eligibility protocol, Georgia's president ordered
the athletic department to stop admitting partial qualifiers.

Wor

ried that it would soon be at a disadvantage in the quest for top
athletes, the University of Georgia began to urge its fellow confer
ence schools to adopt its own rules.

By 1988, all Southeastern Con

ference (SEC) schools had approved conference legislation which,
upon activation, would prohibit the distribution of athletic funding
to partial qualifiers (Reed, 1989; Sanoff & Witkin, 1989).
Once the SEC had adopted eligibility standards which were
higher than the NCAA's, a domino effect ensued.

SEC schools feared

schools in other conferences would have broader labor pools to re
cruit from, so the SEC sought to impose uniform restraints on all
NCAA Division I schools.

Atlantic Coast Conference commissioner
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Gene Corrigan, speaking to the SEC's insistence of uniform re
straints in recruiting, stated, "If a school or conference doesn't
take partial qualifiers, it doesn't want others to" (Sansoff & Wit
kin, 1989).

As the 1989 NCAA Convention drew near, it became clear

that the Southeastern Conference would be the primary sponsor for
Proposition 42.
As far as the NCAA was concerned, there were many different
reactions to the proposed�rule change.

Many believed that the SEC's

proposed modification of athletic eligibility requirements was a
premature and mean spirited move on the part of the conference. How
ever, SEC athletic directors maintained the proposed modifications
of rule 48 were conceived with scholarship and educational achieve
ment foremost in mind (Reed, 1989).

Rhetoric or not, the SEC's

submission of Proposition 42 rekindled many issues which had char
acterized the controversy regarding Proposition 48.
Before elaborating on these issues, for there was significant
debate concerning the single rule change, the creation and imple
mentation of Proposition 42 will be placed in the context of Blurn
er's natural history of a social problem model.

This is important

because the social claims which led to the creation of Proposition
42 were much different than the claims respecting rule 48.
Proposition 42 in a Natural History Context
The foregoing explanation of the University of Georgia's role
in the creation of Proposition 42 is essential in understanding the
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implementation of Proposition 42.

Georgia, by discontinuing its ac

ceptance of partial qualifiers, was, perhaps, the first institution
to perceive, address, and define specific social conditions result
The resulting harmful conditions,

ing from its original action.

mainly recruiting disadvantages, were felt by Georgia (and later all
SEC schools), but not by all NCAA institutions.

These incidents are

consistent with the ideas of Blumer (1971) who stated, "A social pro
blem does not exist for a Society unless it is recognized by that
society to exist" (p. 301).

Eventually, many institutions began to

perceive the potential recruiting disadvantages associated with the
refusal of partial qualifiers.

Imposing uniform restraints was the

easiest way of preventing and/or limiting these disadvantages for
conference schools.
These events set into motion social processes which eventually
resulted in the establishment of Proposition 42 as NCAA regulation.
In essence, these events represented the emergence and legitimation
of a social problem for the NCAA, a social problem characterized by
the unequal recruiting and stockpiling of athletes.

Over this short

period of time awareness of the problem increased and individuals in
the SEC became interested in mobilizing the NCAA for action against
the problem.

This was consistent with Blumer's third stage of the

natural history model.

Therefore, the introduction of rule changes

at the 1989 convention by the SEC represented Blumer's fourth stage
of a social problem's natural history, that being the formation and
approval of an official plan.

Proposition 42, the official plan of
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action, was implemented one year later.
The Debate Over Proposition 42
At this point let me detail the major issues which comprised
the debate between proponents and opponents of Proposition 42.

These

issues were not only contended during the 1989 convention, they were
debated at the 1990 convention and in the months preceding the date
of official implementation, August 1, 1990 (NCAA Convention Proceed
ings, 1989).
With respect to Blumer's natural history of a social problem
model, the following events can be placed in Blumer's fourth and
fifth stages, for there was considerable debate over the formulation
and implementation of the official plan.

This disagreement, which

will also be discussed in Chapter IV, leads one to believe that in
dividual perceptions respecting the nature of the problem were also
conflicting.
The 1989 Convention
At the 1989 NCAA convention, the Southeastern Conference call
ed for the approval of Proposition 42 and for the reaffirmation of
all minimum academic standards previously set forth by the NCAA.
Supporters of Proposition 42 argued that the original intent of
Proposition 48 had been to aid students who failed to achieve a 2.0
GPA in the core curriculum requirements and aid those who had failed
to meet the standardized tests requisites.

However, the loophole
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was primarily utilized by those not meeting the standardized tests
standards.
William H. Powell of the University of Georgia argued at the
convention, "the partial qualifier simply became the old 2.00-grade
qualifier, which in the minds of many was not the true goal of Pro
position 48" (NCAA Convention Proceedings, 1989).

Supporters of

Proposition 42 stated that eliminating the partial qualifier loop
hole and enforcing both tne GPA and standardized tests requirements
would represent a move towards sound academic policy.
Additional backers of Proposition 42, such as Joseph Boland
III from Auburn University and L. Douglas Johnson from the Univer
sity of Miami (Florida), stated that the adoption of the proposal
would send a clear message to junior high and high school students
regarding the importance of educational scholarship.

Johnson, as

well as Marshall M. Criser from the University of Florida, believed
that, given the implementation of Proposition 42, athletic perform
ance would no longer be a substitute for academic performance and
ambiguous standards would cease to exist for high school students
seeking athletic scholarships at any Division I institution (NCAA
Convention Proceedings, 1989).
Furthermore, in discussing the Southeastern Conference's deci
sion to no longer accept partial qualifiers, Boland stated "Proposi
tion 42, if passed, will remove the pressure on all of our institu
tions to grant financial aid to partial qualifiers and in the long
run should increase our retention rate and graduation rate" (NCAA
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Convention Proceedings, 1989, p. 246).

However, Boland, in his ve

hement recommendation for the approval of Proposition 42, made no
mention of the potential recruiting problems schools refusing par
tial qualifiers would undoubtedly incur if the proposal was reject
ed.
Very little formal objection to Proposition 42 is evidenced in
the 1989 Convention Proceedings.

This is surprising considering the

proposal was defeated on the first ballot 151-159 (NCAA Convention
Proceedings, 1989).

What objection is made mention of in the pro

ceedings came from Douglas S. Hobbs of the University of California,
Los Angeles.

In the 1989 NCAA Convention Proceedings Hobbs states

to the convention:
Noting that only three classes have been admitted under Pro
position 48, the [Academic Requirements] committee believes
that it is too early to tinker with 48 and would strongly urge
that the Convention keep hands off at least until we have ex
perienced four, preferably five years, of admitting classes.
(p. 247)
Indeed, rule 48 had been in effect for less than three years when
the vote for Proposition 42 came up.

A leading argument of the

opposition to Proposition 42 was: Why continue to change the en
trance requirements when graduation figures for the first class ad
mitted under the Rule 48 would not be available until 1991 at the
earliest?
A second vote held later in the four day convention approved
Proposition 42 163-154 (Sanoff & Witkin, 1989).

What had seemed on

the surface to be a mere tightening of academic standards for col
lege athletes soon led to a firestorm of controversy and debate for
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many in the NCAA.
Post-Convention
Shortly after the conclusion of the 1989 Convention critics of
the newly adopted proposal began to openly voice their objections.
Critics, such as Al Avant, athletic director of Chicago State Uni
versity, and Jean Chandler-Williams, faculty representative of Clark
College in Atlanta, viewed the rule change as biased toward minor
ities and low income persons.

Chandler-Williams (1989), who viewed

the NCAA's action rather harshly, told the Sporting News, "It's typ
ical of the exploitation of minorities by the NCAA; I see that all
the way down the line" (p. 23).
The vote of approval for Proposition 42 also drew extended
criticism from a select group of Division I coaches.

Georgetown

basketball coach John Thompson, perhaps the most outspoken opponent,
protested the adoption of Proposition 42 by walking off the court
prior to the start of two of his team's conference games January 14,
1989, and January 18, 1989.

Thompson and his supporters, who viewed

Proposition 42 primarily as a civil rights issue, argued that the
rules (the use of standardized test score minimums) set forth by
Proposition 42, while ostensibly setting academic standards for all
students, were really designed to keep poor black individuals and
low income individuals from achieving a higher education (Kroll,
1989; Reed, 1989).

Indeed this explanation for the creation of

Proposition 42 is somewhat contrary to the explanation given above
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involving the University of Georgia.

This, too, will be addressed

in the following chapter.
The week after his protest, Thompson and Georgetown adminis
trators met with NCAA officials in Kansas City, Mo. to discuss Thom
pson's concerns.

At the meeting the officials assured Thompson they

would recommend that the implementation of Proposition 42 be post
poned until an ongoing study of Proposition 48 was completed in 1991
or 1992.

Though the NCAA�later played down the significance of the

meeting, it was, at the time, clearly viewed as a victory for Propo
sition 42 opponents (Kroll, 1989).
Other coaches critical of Proposition 42 included Notre Dame
basketball coach Digger Phelps and Temple University basketball
coach John Chaney.

Phelps believed Proposition 42 would unfairly

penalize students who had not been properly prepared for college by
their high schools.

Phelps (1989) told Mike Douchant of The Sport

ing News, "I think it's unfair for these kids, economically speak
ing; I know we wouldn't have Keith Robinson (a partial qualifier
under Proposition 48) today if this rule held true three years ago,
because Keith Robinson couldn't afford the University of Notre Dame"
(p. 28).

Chaney argued that the rule was an insane, inhumane piece

of legislation that would only fill the streets with more of the
disadvantaged (Sanoff & Witkin, 1989).
Although a number of coaches such as Phelps and Chaney were
openly critical of Proposition 42, it was Thompson's walkout that
spurred national attention and turned NCAA rule making into an un-
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paralleled public policy issue.

Of course Thompson's walkout intro

duced additional questions which were secondary to the implementa
tion of Rule 42.

Included among these questions were: Should a

coach's job description include governing their school's admissions
offices and how much should any school's athletic teams be repre
sentative of the student body? (Douchant, 1989).

These questions

are still pondered today.
However, Thompson's actions did not pass without criticism.
Many in the press questioned whether Thompson and other opponents of
Proposition 42 were solely concerned with the welfare of underprivi
leged players or whether their support owed more to the prospect of
losing star players (Roth, 1989).

Many opponents of Proposition 42

indignantly echoed Thompson's observation that 90% of the 600 or so
students who would be affected by Prop. 42 would be black and poor.
What Thompson and critics of Proposition 42 failed to note was that
the vast majority of students who would be filling the 600 vacated
slots would be black, and many of them poor as well (The New Repub
lic, February 20, 1989).
Proposition 42 was debated, more or less, the entire year of
1989.

Supporters of the rule were eager for its official implemen

tation while opponents invariably wanted to eliminate or at least
postpone the enactment of the rule.

This stage, once again, is

consistent with Blumer's model whereby the implementation of an of
ficial plan of action leads to new processes of collective defini
tion.

Blumer (1971) states that "the people who are in danger of
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losing advantages strive to restrict the plan or bend its operation
to new directions.

Those who stand to benefit from the plan may

seek to exploit new opportunities" (p. 30).
As the 1990 annual convention of the NCAA grew nearer, it be
came clear that Proposition 42 and its effective date of August 1,
1990, would be the major issues.

The convention would have to de

cide whether to let Proposition 42 kick in for the 1990-1991 school
year, modify the rule, or scrap it altogether and return to the less
strict regime known as Proposition 48 (Kaplan & Springen, 1990).
What the 1990 convention in Dallas, Texas, did yield was a
compromise.

On the one hand, athletes not making the grade and ach

ieving the ACT or SAT minimum scores would be eligible for financial
aid based on need.

However, those marginal students not making the

grade would still be barred from athletic programs as freshmen and
still would lose one year of playing eligibility (1990-1991 NCAA
Manual; Time, 1990, January 22).
Though some issues would still be dealt with in the future,
such as the use of standardized tests in determining athletic eli
gibility, the official implementation of Proposition 42 in August of
1990 represented, more or less, the collective definition of a so
cial problem.

As well, the implementation of Proposition 42 would

most likely affect the creation, recognition, and definition of
other social problem natural histories in the realm of college ath
letics.
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Swnmary
This chapter has described the unfolding social processes
which led to the creation of Proposition 42.

Blumer's natural his

tory model was again used to conceptualize the collective definition
of problems which necessitated Proposition 42.

The initial social

claims, meaning those made prior to the collective definition of
problems by the NCAA, were made by the University of Georgia.
The University of Georgia was the first institution to refuse
the acceptance of partial qualifiers.

By taking such action, Geor

gia became the first university to perceive, define, and address the
recruiting disadvantages and educational inefficiency associated
with stockpiling athletes.

After mandating that conference schools

refuse partial qualifiers, the SEC submitted Proposition 42 to the
NCAA at the 1989 convention.
Supporters of Proposition 42 felt the proposal would strength
en the academic scholarship of potential college athletes.

Oppon

ents felt the proposal was biased against minorities and low-income
individuals.

As with Proposition 48, much of the debate also cen

tered on the use of standardized tests as means of ascertaining aca
demic aptitude.
The official implementation of Proposition 42 in August of
1990 did not so much represent the end of the social problem's na
tural history, as it did the beginning.

In essence, by establishing

Proposition 42 as official NCAA policy, the NCAA officially and
collectively defined the need for recruiting controls and continued
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educational integrity.
The next step in this case study is to address the maintenance
of the two rules.

Chapter IV seeks to explain the varying theoret

ical explanations for the use of the two proposals.

In addition,

Chapter IV will seek to decipher the dissimilar perceptions indivi
duals held regarding what it was that Propositions 48 and 42 were
attempting to achieve.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS
In the previous two chapters the organization of the social
claims which prompted the creation of Proposition 48 and Proposition
42 was described.

This required that the procedures, resources,

practices, and accomplishments of a number of claims making groups
be identified.

Blumer's (1971) historical model served as an appro

priate model for the examination of these social problems claims.
Having already described these various social claims, we seek,
in this chapter, to discern the particulars regarding the creation
and implementation of the two propositions using previously develop
ed sociological and economic theory.

For working out of a social

constructionist framework, a sociologist must not only describe the
processes whereby cultural products come to exist, but as well, un
derstand the processes.

As mentioned in Chapter I, two distinct

theoretical perspectives will be used to analyze the two proposi
tions: critical theory and cartel theory.

The first half of this

chapter will consist of an analysis of Propositions 48 and 42 using
critical theory while the second half will deal specifically with an
analysis using cartel theory.
Critical Perspectives
Critical theorists are concerned with the everyday situation
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of people variously distributed in society and in relationships be
tween power, social control and those who resist social control
(Larson, 1986; Pfohl, 1994).

Critical perspectives are useful to

sociologists because historical standpoints are factored into indi
vidual relations to power (Pfohl, 1994).

Hence, critical theorists

interpret human action based upon individual relations to power and
the historical and social contexts out of which actions occur (Wohl,
1975).
According to Calvin J. Larson, the analytical roots of crit
ical theory are two-fold.

Larson (1986) states that critical theory

stems from "Hegalian idealism (e.g., the idea that the capacity to
reason and theorize is a unique and creative human attribute)" and
"the Marxian method of dissecting the contradictory elements and
problems of capitalist society" (p. 172).

The problems of a capi

talist society of which Larson speaks are primarily the social con
sequences of a repetitive economic system: concentrated wealth and
an increase in class consciousness as well as an increase in the
misery of the majority.
However, critical perspectives are not utilized merely to ex
pose the ills of a particular phenomenon, such as cut-throat re
cruiting or dumb jocks in collegiate athletics; rather, critical
perspectives are used to develop theories which situate a phenom
enon's origin within capitalism and reveal the phenomenon's impact
on individual struggles and individual consciousness (Chorbajian,
1985).

And, a critical analysis of sports should not, to borrow
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from the work of Jeffrey Reiman (1995), be discerned as a conspiracy
theory; meaning, proponents of rules 48 and 42 should not be regard
ed as conspirators devoted to creating racially biased eligibility
standards.

Reiman (1995), in his analysis of a systematically bias

ed criminal justice system states:
It is the task of social analysis to find patterns in social
behavior and then explain them. Naturally, when we find pat
terns, particularly patterns that serve some people's inter
ests, we a�e inclined to think of these patterns as intended
by those whose interest are served, as somehow brought into
being because they serve those interests. (p. 5)
The reason conspiracy theory is brought up is that opponents
of Proposition 48 and 42 believed the academic standards established
by the rules were designed specifically to keep poor black and low
income individuals from achieving a higher education.

A conspiracy

theory is not a viable explanation for Rules 48 and 42 for the same
reasons it fails to explain a systematically biased criminal justice
system.
prove.

First, a conspiracy theory is practically impossible to
Second, the degree of secrecy required for such a theory is

impossible in a society as candid as ours.

Finally, conspiracy the

ories are not feasible because they do not correspond with indivi
dual action; meaning most people sincerely believe what they are doing is right (Reiman, 1995).
Historical Context
The factor that will be considered first, in this, the critical
analysis of Propositions 48 and 42, is the social or historical con
text of intercollegiate sport in the 1980s.

The social context is
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merely one of several factors which led to the creation of the two
proposals and should not be considered alone.
As stated in Chapter I, it took the NCAA a number of years to
become the "generally recognized enforcer of amateurism" in college
athletics and how once the NCAA secured this recognition in the mid1950s it took a strong hold of the business of governing intercolle
giate athletics.

What is important to note is that from the 1970s

onward, the revenue the NC.AA brought to member schools and it bur
eaucracy increased considerably.

This was notably due to the

media's coverage of collegiate athletics.

The intensified coverage

of college sports not only precipitated television contracts and
corporate sponsorship, it significantly increased the public's interest in NCAA sports (Pawde, 1989).
But even with the popularity of college athletics at an all
time high in the mid-1980s, there began to emerge significant criti
cism regarding the academic integrity of many NCAA institutions.

As

pointed out in Chapter II, academic requirements were typically left
to individual institutions in the 1970s and early 1980s because the
NCAA did not recognize a definite need for reform in the areas of
academics or recruiting (Cramer, 1986).

By the mid-1980s, however,

social claims regarding the academic integrity of NCAA institutions
were beginning to emerge from the public and certain interest groups
within the NCAA.
To characterize, then, the historical and social context of
the NCAA in the 1980s, it can be said that the association was ripe
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for change.

Mounting sentiment from the public and those inside the

NCAA was that reforms were needed.

No one could have predicted the

degree to which the reforms would polarize NCAA members, athletic
officials, and the public alike.
The Power of the NCAA
As the NCAA evolved, it gradually and continually commercial
ized.

A Marxist organizational analysis of progressive sports sug

gests that over time athletic departments and the NCAA began to mir
ror corporate bureaucracies and other institutions of the like (Cho
rbajian, 1985).

In essence, the social, psychological, physical,

and cultural uses of intercollegiate sports were commercialized for
capital gain (Young, 1986).

Controlling the forces of production,

such as players, scheduling, and media contracts, not only allowed
the NCAA the power to set the conditions of labor, it further pro
vided the NCAA the power to distribute profits (Chorbajian, 1985).
In order to share commercial and championship revenue (or pro
fits), member schools were, and still are, obliged to follow the
rules set forth by the NCAA. Failure to do so can result in the loss
of membership privileges, the opportunity to play for championships,
and significant revenue (NCAA Manual, 1995-1996).

In view of the

following, it is very easy to see that NCAA bureaucracy has a great
deal of power when it comes to fashioning, implementing, enforcing,
and reforming athletic policy.
One underlying question remains.

Is recent policy development
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by the NCAA in the area of freshmen recruiting because of (1) the
NCAA's genuine concern for academic integrity, (2) the NCAA's need
for revenue gain, or (3) a conspiracy designed to reduce black num
bers in college sports?

Revenue gain is one likely explanation and

will be discussed more in depth when I define the NCAA as a cartel.
And though a conspiracy to reduce black numbers in athletics may
seem plausible by many of the propositions harshest critics, Rei
man's (1995) comments would indicate such a conspiracy would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out.

In fact, a

genuine concern for academic integrity seems to be a likely explan
ation.
Proposition 48 was a step taken by the NCAA at addressing, (a)
the maintenance of the regulatory structure, and (b) the importance
of academic values as a standard for all students, including ath
letes (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986).

However, Proposition 48

was a clumsy step towards character reform, for in the NCAA's haste
to devise a solution, it failed to take into account that the rule
would disproportionately affect minorities, particularly blacks.

In

this context, Proposition 48 should not be viewed as a conspiracy,
but rather as an overtone of an inadequate and improperly researched
solution to academic performance and character reform (Zingg, 1983).
This overtone was one reason for the great deal of resistance to
Proposition 48 and 42.
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Resistance of Social Control
As indicated in Chapter I, for a social problem to be offi
cially recognized, it must successfully be navigated through each
stage of Blumer's natural history model.

Progressing from one stage

to the next is problematic for the natural·unfolding of the social
problem, for in each stage there typically is resistance to the im
plementation of social control mechanisms associated with the puta
tive condition (Blumer, 1971).
This leads to a point made earlier regarding the dissimilar
perceptions the general public holds regarding the two rules.

As

discussed in Chapter II and Chapter III, there was much resistance
to the two propositions.

The resistance, however, was not against a

move to mend the academic integrity of collegiate athletics.

Rath

er, the resistance was against the manner in which this action was
to be carried out.

In essence, resistors of the two proposals were

opposed to the overtone of the social control mechanisms, that over
tone being a significant reduction of the number of black athletes
in the NCAA.
It is difficult to say where the NCAA would be today had there
not been any resistance to the two proposals.

It is likely that re

forms which have been instituted since Propositions 48 and 42, such
as a recent ruling which permits a sliding scale for SAT scores
based upon GPA, would have never been implemented.

So though the

opposition did not eliminate the rules completely, it did affect the
formation of future freshmen eligibility requirements.

In the end,
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the rules sent a clear message to potential college athletes regard
ing the importance of academics.
Of course, character reform is merely one explanation or the
ory as to why the NCAA instituted Propositions 48 and 42.

In the

following section, an explanation which is more economic in nature
will be given.

Though in some ways this explanation parallels the

political economy aspect of a structural Marxist approach, it is
dissimilar in that this approach views the NCAA as a somewhat un
stable cartel.
Cartel Theory
As defined in Chapter I, a cartel is:

"an organization of in-

dividuals who collude, conspire and agree upon matters of joint in
terest" (Koch, 1983). Though there is the notion of collusion in
this theory, it is collusion for the sake of economic, rather than
racial, interests.

According to Koch (1983), the NCAA is typically

viewed as a cartel because it:
1.

Sets the maximum price that can be paid for intercolleg
iate athletes;

2.

Regulates the quantity of athletes that can be purchased
(offered scholarships)in any given time period;

3.

Regulates the duration and intensity of usage of those
athletes;

4.

On occasion fixes the price at which sports outputs can be
sold;

5.

Purports to control the property rights to activities such
as the televising of intercollegiate football;

6.

Periodically informs cartel members about transactions,
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costs, market conditions, and sales techniques;
7.

Occasionally pools and distributes portions of the car
tel's profits; and

8.

Polices the behavior of its members and levies penalties
against those who are deemed to be in violation of cartel
rules and regulations. (p. 361)

The NCAA's motivation for this operating mechanism is joint
revenue maximization for its members.

By suppressing and equalizing

(rather than promoting) many kinds of competition among its members,
such as competition for athletes, the NCAA can reduce costs and in
crease financial rewards (Koch, 1983; Lawrence, 1987; Stieber,
1991).
Maintenance of the cartel, then, becomes the fundamental goal
for any cartel.

Its structure will ultimately be the determining

factor in the cartel's success or failure (Spar, 1994).

The follow

ing facets of cartel structure should aid in understanding the im
plementation of Propositions 48 and 42.
Number of Points of Initiative
According to Koch (1983), "A point of initiative is (in cartel
theory) a place where one can buy, sell, exchange, or otherwise utilize the property rights to a resource" (p. 363).

However, if these

purchases and/or sales of a good can be restricted, by either discipline or a monitoring device, then cartel success becomes more likely.
Historically, the NCAA has been rather lax in the disciplining
efforts of its membership, that is if one focuses attention on input
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restraints: rules respecting recruitment, payment (scholarships),
and utilization of athletes.

Given monetary and publicity incen

tives to win, institutions have tremendous pressure placed upon ath
letic departments to disobey NCAA policy respecting recruiting prac
tices (Koch, 1983; Sperber, 1990; Stieber, 1991).

This is particu

larly the case for recruiters and athletic heads in high revenue
sports such as mens' football and basketball.

Taking into account

the size of the NCAA's membership and the infinite number of possi
bilities where rule violations might occur, it is no surprise that
the NCAA has had a difficult time monitoring members.
The NCAA's inability to enforce input restraints does not how
ever mean that it cannot control other points of initiative (Koch,
1983).

In recent decades the NCAA has instituted rules which are

easy to monitor.

For example, the NCAA controls all rights to the

televising of intercollegiate football games, controls all tourna
ment and bowl revenue, and limits actual numbers of athletic con
tests.

This is output containment (Lawrence, 1987).

The NCAA's ex

treme concern over output containment in the 1970s and early 1980s
demonstrated that it had: "relatively less concern for the ultimate
effectiveness of its rules relating to the eligibility and use of
athletes, and relatively more concern for its rules that relate to
its own economic prosperity" (Koch, 1983, p. 364).
As the 1980s unfolded and social claims regarding the integ
rity of NCAA sports began to emerge, the NCAA once again turned its
attention to input restraints.

The NCAA was faced with the task of
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devising eligibility rules which would limit or balance member com
petition, reduce costs, and at the same time bolster academic inte
grity.

Proposition 48, a rule easily monitored, was the result.

Though once the SEC conference adopted eligibility standards which
were higher than the rest of the NCAA, competition between schools
once again became unbalanced.

While NCAA schools were permitted

under Proposition 48 to admit partial qualifiers, schools from the
Southeastern Conference could not.

Therefore, Proposition 42's

elimination of the partial qualifier loophole in 1990 was the NCAA's
attempt to rebalance the recruiting playing field.
Similarity of Interest
Another facet of cartel behavior which helps to explain the
implementation of the two propositions is similarity of interest of
cartel members.

A typical reason why cartels disintegrate is dis-

similarity of interest (Koch, 1983).

Limiting competition among

members prevents the dissimilarity between members.

For example,

Northwestern University was the only Big Ten Conference school to
vote in favor of Proposition 42 (NCAA Convention Proceedings, 1989).
The nine other universities in the Big Ten voted against the mea
sure.

The reason for this was that Northwestern's entrance require

ments for student-athletes were (and still are) well above the stan
dards set by the NCAA and the other nine Big Ten schools (Sperber,
1990).

In order for Northwestern to compete with the other NCAA

schools for blue-chip athletes, it was essential for the school to

71
vote for the elimination of the partial qualifier rule.

Likewise,

additional schools typically losing athletes to big-time schools
with mediocre admissions standards voted in favor of the proposal
(Sperber, 1990).
The fact of the matter is, if a school is not able to recruit
athletes who will win games (particularly football and basketball
games), the school will not receive media exposure and the revenue
associated with the exposure.

Given the millions of dollars at

stake in television revenue, there is little question why there was
such disagreement over a single eligibility rule.
The divergence in self-interest between institutions classi
fied as big-time and those that are not has in the past provoked the
NCAA into subdividing its membership into separate divisions, there
by allowing each division autonomy to make its own rules without
reference to the others.

For example, freshmen academic require

ments at a Division II institution are not as rigid as those at a
Division I institution (NCAA Manual, 1995-96).

Other recent moves

by the NCAA to close the gap between institutions with dissimilar
interests include: letting athletic directors negotiate guarantees
(payments to visiting teams of fees and/or percentages of the gate),
letting institutions with a number of athletic programs compete in
multiple divisions, and letting conferences realign their memberships (Koch, 1983; Sperber, 1990).
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Summary
This chapter has provided two distinct theoretical explana
tions as to the creation and implementation of Propositions 48 and
42.

The theories have also helped to identify contexts in which

similar types of rule creation might occur.·
The critical analysis of the two rules indicated that several
factors played a part in their creation.

Social claims indicating

the need for the toughening of academic requirements and the NCAA's
desire to maintain the regulatory structure are just two examples.
In addition to the support for the two proposals, there was a
great deal of resistance, which has since shaped a great deal of
NCAA policy.

Resistance, in a critical context, consisted of those

groups who believed the academic requirements were too high and
those who thought the standards were specifically designed to re
duce black numbers in collegiate athletics.
Examining the NCAA as a reasonably effective, yet somewhat
unstable, cartel was a second explanation for the creation of Pro
positions 48 and 42.

As mentioned, a cartel seeks to increase pro

fits by limiting competition among member institutions.

Limiting

competition (placing restrictions on recruiting practices) not only
reduces costs, it increases revenue for its membership (Lawrence,
1987).

Furthermore, cartel theory has shown that the NCAA seeks to

maintain the similarity of interest between schools.

This is ac

complished by creating more input restraints, subdividing divisions,
and realigning conferences.
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These are merely two explanations for the creation of two
social control mechanisms which the NCAA has had its members abide
by.

Though other explanations may take different approaches, these

two theories have been appropriate, because they have factored into
each analysis the evaluation of the initial social problems claims.
The final chapter will summarize what this thesis has accom
plished and highlight its implications.

Additional issues which

will be addressed include recent developments in freshmen eligibil
ity requirements and possible ideas for future research.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
General Summary
On page one of this thesis it was stated that "this study
seeks to not only describe and explain the creation process of two
NCAA freshmen athletic eligibility rules, but additionally address
questions concerning why, and for whose interests, the rules were
created.

This aim has been accomplished.

Chapter I illustrated, as concisely as possible, the history
of intercollegiate athletics and the National Collegiate Athletic
Association.

The history demonstrated how the NCAA established con

trol over college athletics and became the predominant regulator and
administrator of social control.

The history also provided a con

text from which to understand the NCAA's authority to function as a
rule creating body.

Chapter I, as well, explored three issues in

the sociology of sport which relate specifically to the creation of
Proposition 48 and Proposition 42.

These issues included sport and

education, sport and racial discrimination, and the nature of stand
ardized achievement tests.
Chapters II and III provided a contextually natured examina
tion of the social claims which ushered in the two proposals.

Blum

er's (1971) natural history model was utilized to examine the emer
gence of the claims, their legitimation in social contexts, how they
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were shaped in discussion, how they came to be addressed in official
policy, and how they were reconstituted in the form of official
planned action (social control).

These two chapters also provided

discussions concerning the key points of contention between the
claims makers and the opposition and/or resistance.
Chapter IV utilized previously developed sociological and eco
nomic theory to interpret the NCAA's use of Propositions 48 and 42
as social control policy. �The critical analysis took into account
such factors as historical context, power, and resistance of social
control in determining that the initial implementation of Proposi
tion 48 was a result of the NCAA's concern for academic integrity
and structural reform.

It was further pointed out that the imple

mentation of the two rules should not be distinguished as a conspir
acy designed to eliminate blacks from collegiate athletics.
An analysis using cartel theory revealed that the NCAA's over
all goal of generating revenue for its bureaucracy and its members
was the predominant reason for the creation of rules 48 and 42. In
creasing the standards that students must attain to participate in
athletics not only evened the competition between contending
schools, it increased the revenue all NCAA members brought in.
Implications
The NCAA traditionally has served a wide range of functions.
As history unfolds and the divergence between its members continues
to grow, it will be interesting to see which functions the NCAA
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gives the greatest amount of attention.

As was the case with this

study, the NCAA did not address academic concerns until the integ
rity of the NCAA was at stake.

Despite public statements regarding

its concern for academics and its philosophy of amateurism, it has
become clear that the NCAA places "its own economic security, and
that of its membership, above any concern that it might have for the
ideals which led to its founding" (Koch, 1983, p. 373).
It is improbable that the demise of the NCAA will be caused by
any of the current issues it faces.

Propositions 48 and 42 are only

two of numerous rules the NCAA has implemented which have caused
controversy.

Furthermore, both Koch (1983) and Stieber (1991) indi

cate, there is a strong rationale for a national organization that
handles intercollegiate athletics.

Hence, it seems likely that the

NCAA will continue to make structural changes when needed, though in
making changes, the NCAA will consistently be aware of its own economic motives.
What implications did the implementation of two proposals,
specifically rule 42, which required the use of the SAT or ACT score
for athletic eligibility, pose to students?

Though many of the op

ponents of the proposals argued that the rules would increase cheat
ing, increase discrimination, and close the door on potential
student-athletes, the simple fact of the matter was that athletes,
black and white, had to concentrate more on academics and less on
athletics (Johnson & Ashe, 1989).

This included eliminating the

"cynicism that specifically de-emphasizes education and views ath-
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letic stardom as a worthy goal in and of itself" (Johnson & Ashe,
1989, p. 140).
Recent Developments
Today, academic requirements take up a rather large chunk of
the NCAA manual. The 1994-95 NCAA manual dedicated ten pages alone
to freshmen eligibility requirements.

Rules are revised frequently.

For example, in 1990 the NCAA raised the minimum ACT score that a po
tential student-athlete must attain from 15 to 18.

Two years later

the NCAA raised the number of core academic courses a student must
complete in high school from 11 to 13 (NCAA Manual, 1994-95; NCAA
Manual, 1990-91).
One rule that has received praise from many, especially those
who had opposed Propositions 48 and 42, was the NCAA's creation of
an Initial-Eligibility Index in 1992.

A major concern of those who

had opposed rule 42 was that many students having superior GPAs in
high school were prohibited from participating in college athletics
because they failed to attain the requisite score on one of the
standardized tests.

The Initial-Eligibility Index provided a slid

ing scale whereby the higher a student's GPA, the lower a score need
ed on the SAT or ACT test (NCAA Manual, 1994-95).

And though the

quandary of using standardized tests as predictors of academic suc
cess still remains, a rule has been created that does not weigh an
entire admissions decision on a single SAT or ACT score.
Other recent developments include the Reports of the Knight
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Foundation by the Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics.

In Oct

ober of 1989 John S. and James L. Knight created the commission with
the hopes of proposing a reform agenda for college sports.

After

nearly three years of research and over three million dollars spent,
the commission issued three reports to the NCAA in March of 1991,
1992, and 1993.

The reports proposed a new model for college ath

letics, concentrating specifically on academic and financial integ
rity.

And though the commission had no formal authority, nearly

two-thirds of its specific recommendations had been endorsed by the
NCAA by 1993 (Knight Foundation, 1991-93).
Future Research
This research has been concerned with the social construction
of social problems and the fashioning of social control mechanisms.
Given that rule creating processes are almost always a result of bar
gaining on the part of claims makers and those who resist social con
trol, and given the fact that rules and/or laws factor into the
daily operations of many associations, governments, unions, clubs,
etc., the opportunities for research on rule creation are innurnerable.
With regard to the NCAA, very little theoretical research has
been conducted concerning the creation of rules by the association.
Indeed, if more studies of this nature were conducted, the academic
community and the public would be more cognizant as to how and why
the NCAA operates as it does.
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In addition, I believe sports sociologists should be more open
to the use of the constructionist perspective and the analysis of
claims making activities.

Indeed, few constructionist studies ap

pear in the literature on the sociology of sport.

Potential areas

of study might include inquiries into the countless rules and regu
lations in the NCAA manual, studies of professional sports associa
tion policies (such as free agency and salary caps), or even an ex
amination of the rules associated with community sports leagues.
Additional areas of study relating to the NCAA might possibly
include the role of institutional racism and patriarchy in the asso
ciation's creation of rules.

Though this thesis has ruled out the

notion of a conspiracy with regard to the creation of rules 48 and
42, it has, however, created ample opportunity for study with re
spect to institutionalized action.

The embarkment of such studies

might help sociologists to better understand the systematic insensi
tivity the NCAA has typically shown to minorities and women when it
comes to developing rules and policies.
To fully understand the impact sports has on our country and
on our lives, it is important that we understand, as completely as
possible, all aspects of sports issues, including rule creating pro
cesses in sports.

Hopefully this thesis has contributed to the lit

erature and breadth of the sociology of sport.

In the future, the

appropriate use of the constructionist perspective may aid sociolo
gists in their evaluation of sports issues and the claims makers who
perpetuate social change.
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